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Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits

Dr. Martin Aleksandrov – 2022

We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.

Titel
Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits
Verlag
IEEE
Datum
2022-07-19
Kennung
DOI: 10.1109/IV51971.2022.9827432
Quelle/n
Erschienen in
Proceedings of the 33rd IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, IV22, June 5-9, 2022, Aachen Germany.
Größe oder Länge
5 pages
Rechte
Die Arbeit steht im Zusammenhang mit dem DFG-Projekt "Fairness and Efficiency in Emerging Vehicle Routing Problems' mit der Förderungsnummer 497791398
BibTeX Code
@INPROCEEDINGS{9827432,
author={Aleksandrov, Martin Damyanov},
booktitle={2022 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV)},
title={Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits},
year={2022},
volume={},
number={},
pages={915--920},
doi={10.1109/IV51971.2022.9827432}}