Envy Freeness Up To One Item: Shall we Duplicate or Remove Resources?
Dr. Martin Aleksandrov – 2022
We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new approximate properties for envy freeness of allocations in this model: DEFX and DEF1. We compare these with two existing axiomatic properties: EFX and EF1. For example, we give the first result confirming that EFX allocations may not exist with general but identical valuations. However, even when they do exist in such problems, we prove that DEFX (and, therefore DEF1) and PO allocations exist whereas EFX and PO allocations may not exist. Our results assert eloquently that DEFX and DEF1 approximate fairness better than EFX and EF1.
Titel
Envy Freeness Up To One Item: Shall we Duplicate or Remove Resources?
Verfasser
Datum
2022-09-13
Kennung
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-16474-3_59
Quelle/n
Erschienen in
In Proceedings of the 21st EPIA Conference on Artificial Intelligence, EPIA 2022, Portugal, August 31-September 2, 2022, Proceedings. Eds. by Goreti Marreiros, Bruno Martins, Ana Paiva, Bernardete Ribeiro, and Alberto Sardinha. LNCS 13566, pages 727-738.
Sprache
eng
Größe oder Länge
11 pages
Rechte
Die Arbeit steht im Zusammenhang mit dem DFG-Projekt "Fairness and Efficiency in Emerging Vehicle Routing Problems' mit der Förderungsnummer 497791398
BibTeX Code
@InProceedings{10.1007/978-3-031-16474-3_59,
author="Aleksandrov, Martin",
editor="Marreiros, Goreti
and Martins, Bruno
and Paiva, Ana
and Ribeiro, Bernardete
and Sardinha, Alberto",
title="Envy Freeness Up to One Item: Shall We Duplicate or Remove Resources?",
booktitle="Progress in Artificial Intelligence",
year="2022",
publisher="Springer International Publishing",
address="Cham",
pages="727--738",
abstract="We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new approximate properties for envy freeness of allocations in this model: DEFX and DEF1. We compare these with two existing axiomatic properties: EFX and EF1. For example, we give the first result confirming that EFX allocations may not exist with general but identical valuations. However, even when they do exist in such problems, we prove that DEFX (and, therefore DEF1) and PO allocations exist whereas EFX and PO allocations may not exist. Our results assert eloquently that DEFX and DEF1 approximate fairness better than EFX and EF1.",
isbn="978-3-031-16474-3"
}
author="Aleksandrov, Martin",
editor="Marreiros, Goreti
and Martins, Bruno
and Paiva, Ana
and Ribeiro, Bernardete
and Sardinha, Alberto",
title="Envy Freeness Up to One Item: Shall We Duplicate or Remove Resources?",
booktitle="Progress in Artificial Intelligence",
year="2022",
publisher="Springer International Publishing",
address="Cham",
pages="727--738",
abstract="We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new approximate properties for envy freeness of allocations in this model: DEFX and DEF1. We compare these with two existing axiomatic properties: EFX and EF1. For example, we give the first result confirming that EFX allocations may not exist with general but identical valuations. However, even when they do exist in such problems, we prove that DEFX (and, therefore DEF1) and PO allocations exist whereas EFX and PO allocations may not exist. Our results assert eloquently that DEFX and DEF1 approximate fairness better than EFX and EF1.",
isbn="978-3-031-16474-3"
}