
SLIDEDroid: A SECURE LIGHTWEIGHT IDENTITY FOR THE ANDROID PLATFORM

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Methodology





Current Problems of Mobile eIDs

- „local storage“ approaches:
 - no security
 - software-based security
 - hardware-backed security
 - Secure Element
 - Trusted Execution Environment
 - „cloud-based“ approaches:
 - only “auth_token” on device
 - identity attributes at IdP
- security / privacy vs. usability / market coverage

(Träder et al. [TZH17], Ohlendorf et al. [OSM19])



Student ID Card: Android Platform Security Features

KeyMaster



TEE

SE

(ROBO)


SafetyNet Attestation



Software based

(CERT, KEY)


Key & ID Attestation



TEE/SE based


(CERT, KEY)

Biometric Prompt





Proposed Architecture




- derived eID
- PKI-based infrastructure
- certificates with identity attributes (X.509)
- mTLS for identification & authentication
- secure deployment mechanism
- only standardized HW security components used




Proof-of-Concept: Student ID Card


eID Derivation




Management & Maintenance




Identification & Authentication






Student ID Card Deployment: Provisioning process




Student ID Card Deployment: Personalization process



Student ID Card: Identification /Authentication process



Student ID Card: Hashed Attributes



...	
name:	hash(name salt ₁)
surename:	hash(surename salt ₂)
date of birth:	hash(d.o.b. salt ₃)
student ID:	hash(student ID salt ₄)
...	



name:	(name, salt ₁)
student ID:	(student ID, salt ₄)



Security & Privacy Aspects

security

- + local eID
- + standardized, well-established protocols
- + hardware-backed security
- local MITM attacker scenario
- no secure I/O

privacy

- + data economy
- unique ID
- user tracking (TLS 1.2)
- bruteforcing of attributes
- SP can sell verified identity attributes



Conclusion & Future Work

- current solutions → security / privacy vs. usability / market coverage
- SLIDEDroid secure lightweight identity solution for Android
- Proof-of-Concept → Student ID Card
- security / privacy evaluation → still some shortcomings remain
- analyze shortcomings and suggest possible solutions
- evaluate SLIDE on iOS

Contact US



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Resources

- TZH17 Daniel Träder, Alexander Zeier, and Andreas Heinemann. Design and Implementation Aspects of Mobile Derived Identities. In: Open Identity Summit 2017 (2017).
- OSM19 Tim Ohlendorf, Wolfgang Studier, and Marian Margraf. Digitale Identitäten auf dem Smartphone. In: Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD, Band 43 (2019)
- ROBO <https://developer.android.com/distribute/tools/promote/brand.html>, Google Inc.
- CERT <https://thenounproject.com/icon/89083/>, Nice and Serious
- KEY <https://svgsilh.com/image/149030.html>, svgsilh.com
- LAPTOP <http://togotv.dbcls.jp/ja/togopic.2017.26.html>, DataBase Center for Life Science