Dagstuhl Report about Secure Routing for the Internet online

Our report about the Dagstuhl Seminar 18242 was published: http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/DagRep.8.6.40. The seminar was organized by Philippa Gill, Amir Herzberg, Adrian Perrig, and Matthias Wählisch.

News from Jan 12, 2019

The seminar was focused on the following aspects of routing security, mostly in the contextof traditional inter-domain routing security: (i) Protocol design vs tooling, (ii) sources ofrelevant routing data and their accuracy/collection challenges, including policy databases,(iii) the need for metadata and dataset “labelling”, (iv) monitoring and detection of routingattacks and anomalous incidents, such as BGP hijacks and route leaks, incentives for networkoperators to adopt routing security protocols, (v) testbeds for routing experiments, (vi)hijacks as enabling attacks against ToR and Bitcoin, on the application level, (vii) preventionof routing attacks, (viii) anonymity, privacy and (anti-)censorship. Moreover, we discussed indepth about (ix) PKI and cryptographic verification and protection mechanisms, and theiruse in securing routing infrastructures, such as the RPKI and BGPsec protocols. Finally, we(x) approached BGP flowspecs, DDoS attacks and QoS in the Internet as separate topicsof interest in the field. Another goal of the seminar was to touch upon (xi) future networkrouting architectures which offer routing security “by design”, especially in light of demandingupcoming applications such as IoT, car-to-car communications, sensor swarms, and wirelessrouting at scale, and identify related security and privacy concerns and objectives

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